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Abstract
Computer-based systems are increasingly being exposed to evolving security
threats, which often reveal new vulnerabilities. A formal analysis of the evolv-
ing threats is difficult due to a number of practical considerations such as in-
complete knowledge about the design, limited information about attacks, and
constraints on organisational resources. In our earlier work on RISA (RIsk as-
sessment in Security Argumentation), we showed that informal risk assessment
can complement the formal analysis of security requirements. In this paper, we
integrate the formal and informal assessment of security by proposing a uni-
fied meta-model and an automated tool for supporting security argumentation
called OpenRISA. Using a uniform representation of risks and arguments, our au-
tomated checking of formal arguments can identify relevant risks as rebuttals to
those arguments, and identify mitigations from publicly available security cata-
logues when possible. As a result, security engineers are able to make informed
and traceable decisions about the security of their computer-based systems. The
application of OpenRISA is illustrated with examples from a PIN Entry Device
case study.
Keywords: Structured Argumentation, Risk Assessment, Security Analysis,
Public Catalogue Search, PIN Entry Device
1. Introduction
Security risks evolve in software-intensive systems. Attackers exploit increas-
ing number of vulnerabilities, ranging from cryptographic protocols to human
subjects. Introducing new technologies to such systems often imposes security
risks with higher likelihood to do harm to the assets. In practice, security is
not perfect due to limited resources available to security engineers, uncertainties
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about the attackers’ skills and commitment, and incomplete knowledge about
evolving threats and vulnerabilities.
Recent years found structured argumentation approaches effective to build
safety cases (Kelly, 1998) and to reason about both formal and informal de-
scriptions of software systems.W to demonstrate compliance to laws and regu-
lations (Burgemeestre et al., 2010; Cyra and Go´rski, 2007), to trace and justify
software design decisions (Potts and Bruns, 1988), to establish confidence in
software development (Graydon and Knight, 2008), and to build dependability
cases to assure compliance in software development (Huhn and Zechner, 2010).
Extending the work on security argumentation (Haley et al., 2008), we have
developed a framework for reasoning about security requirements of the system
where abstract properties are important. For instance, it is possible to formally
prove that an access control model will deny access to the Human Resource
(HR) database by those who do not work in the HR department.
However, real-life phenomena could defy generalisation and abstraction, there
the framework needs to support the uses of informal arguments. For instance,
many HR employees could share a common password, and when one of the em-
ployees leaves the department and the common password is not changed, thus
access becomes available to someone who is no longer a member of the the HR
department.
Through the use of RIsk assessment in Security Argumentation (RISA)
method (Franqueira et al., 2011), we have shown how risk assessments itera-
tively challenge the satisfaction of security requirements. The main limitation
of our previous work lies in that the separate models for formal arguments and
risk-based arguments, which hinders the automated tool support.
In this work, this limitation is addressed by the means of three contributions
of the RISA method. First, we introduce an integrated modelling language to
represent risk assessment and arguments uniformly. Second, the OpenRISA tool
support extends the OpenArgue (Yu et al., 2011) argumentation tool to perform
automated checking of the formal arguments. Third, we incorporate an auto-
mated search functionality to match catalogues of security vulnerabilities such
as CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification patterns1)
and CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration2) with the keywords derived from
the arguments. Compared to the previously ad hoc search, the new tool supports
a complete coverage of these public catalogues of security expertise.
The OpenRISA approach has presented a research contribution to represent
and reason about risks associated with software security requirements. The
argumentation part of the work has been evaluated with an industry evaluator
at DeepBlue Yu et al. (2011).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews rel-
evant background on the satisfaction of security requirements and security ar-
guments, whilst Section 3 reviews related work. Section 4 provides an overview
1http://capec.mitre.org/
2http://cwe.mitre.org/
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of the RISA method, Section 5 describes the corresponding OpenRISA tool sup-
port. Section 6 demonstrates the tool supported method with a PIN Entry
Device (PED) example. Section 7 discusses and points to future research and
development work. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2. Background
The RISA method builds on the notions of satisfaction of security require-
ments, and outer and inner arguments, introduced by Haley et al. (2008).
2.1. Requirements satisfaction arguments about the problem depicted in a prob-
lem diagram
Following the Problem Frames approach in requirements engineering (Jack-
son, 2001), software system artefacts are separated into S, W , and R, where
S represents the specification of a software system, W represents a description
of the world in which the software system is to be used (i.e., the context), and
R represents a description of the requirements. The software within the sys-
tem context should satisfy the requirements. This semantics of a requirements
problem can be described by the following entailment relationship:
W,S ` R (1)
The world context W consists of domains (short for problem world domains);
elements of the world can be either physical, such as people and hardware,
or logical, such as software and data structure. Typically, W also contains
assumptions made about these domains.
Using the Problem Frames approach (Jackson, 2001), the analysis of a re-
quirement problem follows the principles of divide-and-conquer (i.e. decompo-
sition) and unite-and-rule (i.e. composition). First of all, the knowledge of the
physical domains in the context directly referenced and/or constrained by the
requirement statements R are analysed, in order to bring in indirectly related
domains to the analysis until a machine specification S is found. Around S, the
collection of the domains in the physical world W are depicted in a diagram
where nodes represent the domains and edges represent the phenomena shared
between the domains. A shared phenomenon could be an event controlled by
one domain and observed by another. As such, the so-called problem context
diagram , illustrated in Figure 1, captures the knowledge of high-level causality
about the behaviour between these domains. The OpenRISA tool includes the
components of OpenPF which support the creation of context diagrams.
2.2. Toulmin-structured arguments and argumentation processes
According to Haley et al. (2008), arguments for requirements satisfaction
are in two kinds: the first argument constructed, called the outer argument, is
a formal proof that relies on certain assumptions about the system context and
the specification. The outer argument is formal in the sense that it typically uses
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Figure 1: Syntactical elements of a problem diagram are illustrated by the “Required Be-
haviour” problem frame. A requirement is shown as a dotted oval, and a specification is
shown as a rectangle with double vertical strips on the left. Problem world domains are
shown as rectangles. The letters on solid edges indicate the interfaces between the domain
nodes. A dotted arrow indicates the phenomena of the domain constrained by the require-
ment. A dotted line (not shown in this diagram) indicates the phenomena of the domain
referenced by the requirement. Abbreviations of the name of the nodes are optional.
a mathematical logic such as the prepositional logic. The assumptions made
in the outer arguments are expanded in and supported by the informal inner
argument which uses the structured natural language because those assumptions
cannot be described in the formal logic.
Effective argumentation establishes a claim that one wishes to convince the
world of. In other words, claim is the object of an argument, a statement that
one wishes to convince an audience to accept. In an effective argument, ground
truths or facts need to provide the underlying support for an argument, e.g.,
evidence, facts, and common knowledge. In other words, ground is a piece of
evidence, a fact, a theory, a phenomenon considered to be true. In addition,
warrants connect and establish relevancy between the grounds and the claim.
A warrant explains how the grounds relate to the claim, but not the validity
of the grounds. Structurally, warrant is a statement that links a ground and a
claim, showing how a claim is justified by ground(s).
Rebuttals express conditions under which an argument does not hold by
invalidating any of the grounds and associated warrants , thus undercutting
the support to the claim. Grounds and warrants may need to be argued, mak-
ing them claims of nested arguments, therefore grounds and warrants can also
be attacked by the rebuttals . Here, rebuttal is a counterargument which un-
dermines the support for the claim. Specifically in the case of security-related
argumentation, rebuttals represent risks. Rebuttals can be mitigated in order
to restore the confidence that the claim of the rebutted argument still holds. A
mitigation, while negating a rebuttal, introduces additional knowledge to show
that the rebuttal, i.e. a risk, can somehow be tolerated. In doing so, a miti-
gation can also introduce new risks, leading to new iterations of rebuttals and
mitigations in argumentation.
Mitigating a rebuttal requires an iterative process, which introduces addi-
tional arguments incrementally. The notion of round denotes the number of
iterations from the beginning. Using the round numbers, cyclic arguments can
be avoided by eliminating the redundant facts from the increments at differ-
ent rounds. Specific to security satisfaction arguments, there are two types
of rebuttals, risks and mitigations. In general the argumentation structure
iteratively relates inner arguments of logical rebuttals to outer arguments of
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boundary expansions. Starting from the initial ground about the software sys-
tem in question, every round of argumentation may introduce additional facts
and/or enclose more elements into the system boundary, further the scope of
the knowledge.
In summary, each claim of the outer argument can also be represented with
Toulmin’s argument structure as (a
c→ b), where a is a ground, c is a warrant
and b is the claim to be challenged by examining the ground a and the warrant
c. A premise is a logic statement (Huth and Ryan, 2004) as is used in the outer
argument. Each premise in an outer argument is the beginning for one thread
of inner arguments built from several rounds of inner argumentation. Inner
arguments are indicated by nested risks and mitigations in different rounds.
In the supported iterative and recursive argumentation process, arguments
represented as such are incremental in the sense that any claim can be argued
against in the next round of argumentation. They are also non-monotonic in
the sense that the new arguments may introduce new information that overrules
the accepted facts in previous rounds.
2.3. Risk arguments for security requirements
According to the BS ISO/IEC 27005 (2011), information security risk is
associated with the potential that threats will exploit vulnerabilities of one or a
group of assets and cause harm to an organization, where asset is “anything that
has value to the organization and which therefore requires protection”. Assets of
relevance are the ones “stored in or accessed by the system-to-be” (Haley et al.,
2008). Since vulnerability is the element of risk upon which security engineers
can mostly act upon, vulnerabilities are our starting point for the identification
of risks affecting the system being designed. Therefore, the RISA method is
supported by catalogues that describe security vulnerabilities. Mitigation, in
risk assessment, refers to treatments that aim at minimising risks by reducing
the likelihood and/or the impact. It can act in many ways, e.g., by removing a
risk, by changing the negative consequences of a risk, or by avoiding a risk all
together; the catalogues also help security engineers in this respect.
Implementing security goals, security requirements are regarded as constraints
on functional requirements that protect the assets from identified harms, con-
trolling security risks in the software system. For example, to maintain the
confidentiality of personnel data while handling the requests for HR data, the
security requirement shall guarantee that only those requests coming from the
members of human resources staff are considered.
In the most general form, the outer arguments show whether properties of
W and S entail the security requirements (as shown in Equation 1) by using
the claims about how the system behaviour conforms to the domain behaviour
premises of the system; this is captured by Equation 2 (Haley et al., 2008).
(domain behaviour premises) ` (security requirements) (2)
Expressed in propositional logic, for example, domain experts can reason
about the satisfaction of the argument formally. Of course, the choice of logic
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flow of argumentation
Warrants
Grounds Claim
argument
counterargument
Rebuttals
Figure 2: Structure of arguments used in the framework of Haley et al. (2008)
is not prescriptive: more expressive logics could also be used as long as the
underlying reasoning can be supported by translating into the corresponding
logic formula. More expressive logics may be used here but they might be less
amenable to automated analysis.
Outer arguments rely on properties of W and S (domain behaviour premises),
some of which may turn out to be arguable assumptions. These premises need
to be challenged, and be grounded in facts if possible, or taken as true, for
instance, on the basis of a lack of contrary evidence.
The general purpose of an inner argument is to try to rebut an outer argu-
ment. Notice that the outer arguments establish the scope of security assess-
ment, whilst the inner arguments deepen the assessment. The general structure
of inner arguments is shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 3 highlights a metamodel of the argument diagram structure used
in this work.
Figure 3: The metamodel of argument diagrams, the detailed structure of boolean expressions
is omitted here.
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3. Related Work
Related work is organised around structured argumentation, including its
process and representation, and risk assessment.
3.1. Structured Argumentation
Argumentation process provides a rationale to convince an audience that a
claim should be considered valid. Three qualities are often discussed in the in-
formal argumentation literature: convincingness, soundness, and completeness.
Convincingness relates to whether the argumentation is compelling enough to
assure an intended audience that the conclusion reached is reasonable (Haley
et al., 2008). Soundness relates to whether the argumentation fulfils the argu-
mentation schema and is based on “true premises”(Graydon and Knight, 2008),
i.e. on true grounds and warrants. Completeness relates to whether nothing has
been omitted that could lead to a different conclusion about a claim (Graydon
and Knight, 2008; Shum and Hammond, 1994).
A known problem in argumentation is the subjectivity involved in identifying
arguments and counter-arguments (which relate to soundness), and the difficulty
in determining completeness. Proposals to reduce these problems rely on the
help of: (i) pre-defined critical questions (Walton, 1996; Atkinson et al., 2004),
(ii) what-if scenarios (Baroni et al., 2009), (iii) expert assurance checks (Graydon
and Knight, 2008), (iv) guidelines and checklists (Lipson and Weinstock, 2008),
or (v) how/why questioning, as proposed in (Haley et al., 2008). However, with
a few exceptions e.g., Cyra and Go´rski (2011), these approaches either rely on
the availability of experts or are rather static. The OpenRISA support provided
to the RISA method allows the practical leverage of evolving public catalogues,
updated using input by a pool of security experts from several organisations
(http://cwe.mitre.org/community/index.html).
3.2. Process of Argumentation
The process of Toulmin-style argumentation (Toulmin et al., 1984), enhanced
with recursion from Newman and Marshall (1991), follows a depth-first style and
is based on a 2-persons game. It provides a neat and intuitive view about the
evolution of an argument in the format of a debate or dialogue between two
players. For example, Cohen (1987) regards argumentation as a dialogue, while
Walton (1996) regards it as a debate where the opponent asks critical questions.
This process of argumentation, however, is not suitable when reasoning
about security with risk assessment. In this case, it often happens that one risk
challenges (i.e. rebuts) several premises, one mitigation rebuts several risks,
and several mitigations rebut a single risk. As a result, a breadth-first style of
argumentation scales better for practical security reasoning where risks are iden-
tified for a bundle or all premises, then mitigations are identified and analysed
for all risks, before a next round of argumentation starts. The RISA method is
designed for such practical needs, while still providing the ability to reconstruct
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argument threads via backward traceability. Thus, it is possible to trace mitiga-
tions back to risks, then back to premises, which relate to the outer arguments
and, ultimately, to the security requirements to be validated in the first place.
The argumentation process implied by Toulmin’s model with recursion is
well-suited to be represented as a tree structure of arguments, where each
(counter)argument rebuts one argument. However, rather than a tree, a more
complex graph structure of arguments is needed to represent relationships be-
tween arguments in risk-based argumentation. This point is illustrated in Fig. 4
where R1.2 rebuts both premises P1 and P2, mitigation M2.2 rebuts both risks
R1.1 and R1.4, and both M2.1 and M2.2 rebut the same risk R1.1. Although
the argumentation structure represented in the figure is a connected tree, it may
also be a forest where some grounds/warrants may not be fully connected to all
the claims (Bollobas, 2002).
P1
R1.1 R1.4 R1.2
P2
M2.1 M2.2 rebuts
Figure 4: Illustrative example of relationships which can occur between arguments in risk-
based argumentation: one risk rebuts two premises, one mitigation rebuts two risks and two
mitigations rebut one single risk.
The representation of relations between arguments on a graph structure is
no novelty. Dung (1995), unlike Toulmin et al. (1984), abstracted completely
from arguments’ structures and concentrated on these relations proposing a
framework of argumentation useful for a n-persons game.
Dung’s framework of argumentation AF is a pair AF =< AR, attacks >,
where AR is a set of arguments and attacks is a a set of binary relations on
AR, i.e. attacks ⊆ AR×AR; attacks relations correspond to Toulmin’s rebuttal
relations. If A attacks B, then attacks(A,B) still holds, and this is repre-
sented as a directed graph where arguments are nodes and attacks relations
are arcs. Therefore, risk-based argumentation is more suitable for the generic
graph representation by Dung than for the traditional tree representation of
argument-counterargument by Toulmin. In the OpenRISA tool we represent ar-
guments, i.e. the structured relationships between subsequent arguments, as a
directed acyclic graph. Cycles between a same set of rebuttals and mitigations
are avoided by restricting the target of rebuttals and mitigations to facts and
rules in any one of the previous rounds.
3.3. Risk Assessment
Risk assessment involves distinct steps of risk identification, risk analysis/e-
valuation, and risk treatment. There are three basic perspectives on risk identi-
fication; it can be asset-driven, threat-driven or vulnerability-driven. The asset-
driven approach prescribed, e.g., by the BS ISO/IEC 27005 (2011), Hakemi
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et al. (2014) and CORAS (Lund et al., 2011), considers assets as the primary fo-
cus for the identification of risks. The threat-driven approach adopted, e.g., by
the NIST standard (SP 800-30 rev. 1), identifies threats (sources and events)
as the starting point for risk identification. Vulnerability-driven approaches,
on the other hand, consider vulnerabilities on the target of analysis as attack
surface which represent risks; threat agents will, at some point, discover and ex-
ploit them. Therefore, it is not imperative to pinpoint the threat agent. Tools
based on vulnerability scanning, such as Nesus3, and the RISA method that
uses catalogues of vulnerabilities take this last approach. Moreover, it adopts a
context-based elicitation of risks through argumentation allowing logical trace-
ability of risks and mitigations to premises and security requirements.
The identification of risks may be supported by different artefacts and meth-
ods. For example, checklists (as in the BS ISO/IEC 27005 (2011) and SP 800-30
rev. 1), workshop with stakeholders (as in CORAS (Lund et al., 2011)), threat
taxonomies (e.g., OWASP4), and in-house catalogues containing information
about previous incidents. These approaches have drawbacks; checklists soon
become obsolete, workshops are resource-intensive and hard to schedule with
stakeholders, taxonomies and in-house catalogues are not comprehensive. The
RISA method addresses these drawbacks by considering ever-changing security
catalogues maintained by experts around the world. Nevertheless, the OpenRISA
tool is flexible enough to be complemented by any of these other approaches.
Risk identification in early stages of system development is part of require-
ments elicitation, and is often threat-driven. Such approaches assume an at-
tacker/misuser/abuser as threat agent and elaborate on “what can go wrong
with the system in the environment” (Raspotnig and Opdahl, 2013), i.e., ac-
tions performed by the threat agent. One example of such approaches is Misuse
Case (Sindre and Opdahl, 2005), which assumes an identifiable sequence of ac-
tions performed by a misuser. However, both misuser and actions may not be
known, or may be irrelevant. Let’s consider the risk PIN is revealed if sent un-
encrypted within the PED and the PED can be tampered. It states that the risk
is derived from the combination of a threat (PIN is revealed if sent unencrypted
within the PED), and a vulnerability (PED can be tampered). The threat agent
could be identified as a generic attacker, however, the actions performed by the
attacker to exploit the vulnerability become irrelevant if the defender choose
to mitigate the risk, e.g., by encrypting the PIN inside the PED. Now, let’s
consider the risk PIN is revealed by missing PIN field masking. The threat can
be exercised by exploiting the vulnerability, i.e., missing PIN field masking in
PED keypad. In this case, the threat agent is not identifiable (it could be, e.g.,
a customer or a merchant in a shop, or a waiter in a restaurant) and the steps
which lead any threat agent to exploit the vulnerability are neither identifiable
nor relevant. Exposing the risks and proposing mitigations to the vulnerability
become the rationale of RISA, spelled out by the risk-based argumentation.
3http://www.tenable.com/products/nessus
4https://www.owasp.org
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4. The Tool-Supported RISA Method
An overview of the data flow for a security analyst to use the OpenRISA
tool supported approach is illustrated in Fig. 5. To support the analyst, the
Analyst
Security Catalogues
(CWE, CAPEC)
Domain-specific
security
keywords
specify Lucene-based
search engine
Context Diagram
Model Editor
OpenArgue Editor
Security 
requirements
elicit
Context
Diagrams
analyse
problem
frames
causal
analysis
Premises
search
relevant informal
risks/mitigations
(decreasoner)
Propositional Logic 
Reasoning
outer
argument
inner
argument
process
external store
internal store
User
flow
LEGEND
Figure 5: An overview flowchart of the OpenRISA tool support
OpenRISA tool has four major components: (1) a model-based editor to help the
analyst in eliciting problem diagrams from the description of requirements; (2)
the causality (in terms of shared phenomena) in the problem diagrams provides
the analyst with an initial set of premises to create the outer arguments, using
the OpenRISA argumentation tool; (3) the Lucene-based search engine helps the
analyst to find relevant risks and mitigations from the domain specific keywords
used in the outer arguments; (4) the analyst can then label the assumptions into
formal propositions using inner argument logic expressions in the OpenRISA
tool, which will then feed into the proposition logic reasoner by the algorithm
to check the reasoning.
These OpenRISA components can be used iteratively therefore there is no
predetermined ordering between them. Due to the data flow dependencies, the
natural order is recommended by the steps of the RISA method illustrated in
Fig. 6. In the following step-by-step descriptions of the RISA method, we show
how the components of the tool are used to support the analyst, as depicted in
Fig. 5. The steps extend the process of argumentation for security requirements
proposed in the Haley et al. framework by incorporating a process of risk
assessment (see Fig. 6).
4.1. Step 1 to Step 3
In Step 1 (Identify Functional Requirements), functional requirements of the
system and the system context (domains and shared phenomena) are identified.
These requirements may be derived from the higher-level goals of the system.
In Step 2 (Identify Security Goals), assets that need to be protected, and
security goals are identified. Notice that security goals concerns the protection
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Figure 6: Schematic overview of the RISA method
of “valuable assets”, which are specific contextual domains not concerned by
generic functional goals.
In Step 3 (Identify Security Requirements), security requirements are de-
rived from security goals, and are expressed as constraints on the functional
requirements identified in Step 1. System context diagrams (one for each secu-
rity requirement) are constructed in this step.
4.2. Step 4: Construct Outer Arguments
The outer arguments for security requirements are constructed in Step 4 of
RISA based on problem diagram analysis. These outer arguments make use of
domain properties to refer to the domains in the context of analysis which may
expand the scope to reason about additional phenomena. Behavioural premises
used in the outer arguments may contain risks, which are identified using a
systematic risk assessment process in RISA. This is represented in Fig. 6 by the
arrow from Step 4 to Step 5.
Steps 5 to 8 correspond to the process of constructing inner arguments in
the Haley et al. framework. These four steps show how domain assumptions
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in outer arguments are challenged by means of risk assessment based on public
security catalogues.
Public catalogues provide input for Steps 5 and 6. In the RISA method,
we use CAPEC and CWE to feed the identification of risks with descriptions
and information about known attack patterns and weaknesses in software, and
for information on how these attacks and weaknesses can be mitigated. In-
house security catalogues or other methods, such as CORAS’ workshops with
stakeholders (Lund et al., 2011), may complement public security catalogues.
The recursion of the inner argumentation is represented in Fig. 6 by both
the indirect connection between Step 5 and Step 7 (through Step 6), which
involves the process of finding risks and mitigations to these risks, and the
direct connection between Step 7 and Step 5, which involves the process of
finding new risks in mitigations. Since these risks are attached to arguments and
security requirements, prioritising risks indirectly results in the prioritisation of
arguments and security requirements.
4.3. Step 5: Identify Risks
In this step, behavioural premises in outer arguments regarding the domains
(arrow from Step 4 to Step 5 in Fig. 6) are analysed in terms of potential risks
(which rebut the premises). Public security catalogues are then searched to find
known security weaknesses and attack patterns.
Automated catalogues Search
The search in both catalogues is automated as follows.
1. Each XML dataset entry (e.g., CAPEC v2.1: http://capec.mitre.org/
data/xml/capec_v2.1.xml, and CWE v2.5: http://cwe.mitre.org/
data/xml/cwec_v2.5.xml.zip catalogues) is converted into a text file
using the XSL scripts shown in Fig. 7 and 8;
2. Those text files are searched, given keywords, using the Lucene Java li-
brary (Hatcher and Gospodnetic, 2004) through a command line script
(query.sh);
3. The PorterStemAnalyzer from Lucene, which implements the Porter Stem-
ming algorithm (Porter, 1980), is used to remove common suffixes from
keywords, when applicable. For example, keywords “connection”, “con-
nected” or “connecting” will all be reduced to the stem “connect”, and the
search for this stem in the text will recover catalogue entries containing
any such variations in suffixes common in English.
In the following scripts in Figures 7 and 8, we use XPath expressions such as
“/Attack Catalog/ Attack Patterns/Attack Pattern” and “/Weakness Catalog/Weaknesses/Weakness”
to extract the natural language descriptions of the XML records about attacks
and weaknesses in the CAPEC and CWE catalogues, respectively. The “for-
each” clauses in the stylesheets ensure that every textual description in the
records are covered. As a result, a single textual file name corresponding to
“ID” of the record can be obtained, feeding into Lucene Information Retrieval
12
1 <s t y l e s h e e t xmlns=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /1999/XSL/Transform” v e r s i o n = ” 1 .0 ” >
2 <output method=” t e x t ”/>
3 <t emp la t e match=”/”>
4 <f o r−each s e l e c t=”/ At t a ck Ca ta l og / A t t a c k Pa t t e r n s / A t t a ck Pa t t e r n ”>
5 <document h r e f=” s p l i t / a t t a c k p a t t e r n {@ID} . t x t ” method=” t e x t ”>
6 <f o r−each s e l e c t=” . / D e s c r i p t i o n /Summary/Text ”>
7 <va lue−o f s e l e c t=” . ”/>
8 </ fo r−each>
9 <f o r−each s e l e c t=” . / Example−I n s t a n c e D e s c r i p t i o n / T e x t T i t l e ”>
10 <va lue−o f s e l e c t=” . ”/>
11 </ fo r−each>
12 <f o r−each s e l e c t=” . / Example−I n s t a n c e D e s c r i p t i o n /Text ”>
13 <va lue−o f s e l e c t=” . ”/>
14 </ fo r−each>
15 </document>
16 </ fo r−each>
17 </ temp la t e>
18 </ s t y l e s h e e t>
Figure 7: XSL script used to generate one ‘.txt’ file for each XML-based CAPEC entry
(CAPEC XML 1.6), containing natural language text fetched from the fields indicated
1 <s t y l e s h e e t xmlns=” ht tp : //www.w3 . org /1999/XSL/Transform” v e r s i o n = ” 1 .0 ” >
2 <output method=” t e x t ”/>
3 <t emp la t e match=”/”>
4 <f o r−each s e l e c t=”/Weakness Cata log /Weaknesses /Weakness”>
5 <document h r e f=” s p l i t / weakness {@ID} . t x t ” method=” t e x t ”>
6 <va lue−o f s e l e c t=” . / D e s c r i p t i o n /Desc r ip t ion Summary ”/>
7 <f o r−each s e l e c t=” . / D e s c r i p t i o n / Ex t e nd ed De s c r i p t i o n /Text ”>
8 <va lue−o f s e l e c t=” . ”/>
9 </ fo r−each>
10 </document>
11 </ fo r−each>
12 </ temp la t e>
13 </ s t y l e s h e e t>
Figure 8: XSL script used to generate one ‘.txt’ file for each XML-based CWE entry (CWE
XML 2.1), containing natural language text fetched from the fields indicated
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engine such that any matching documents can be traced back to the correspond-
ing entry.
Running a search involves the input of keywords in a query text file (‘query.txt’),
one keyword per line, and running the command line query script to execute
Lucene’s search functionalities5. Keywords may be composed of more than one
word.
Therefore, queries query.sh CAPEC and query.sh CWE perform the search
for given keywords in the CAPEC and CWE catalogues, respectively, and
query.sh CAPEC CWE performs the search in both catalogues. The output is
also a text file (hits.txt) containing the triplex (keyword, catalogue, entry ref-
erence), one per line. For example:
victim CAPEC attack_pattern_89
password CWE weakness_258
4.4. Step 6: Identify & Classify Mitigations
This step involves analysing the catalogue entries related to risks identified
in the previous step to (i) find appropriate security mechanisms for mitigating
them (arrow from the catalogues to Step 6) and (ii) classify these mitigations
according to two categories of risk treatment: mitigate-by-system and mitigate-
by-context.
There are risks for which the obligation to mitigate them is either fully
transferred to the system context (when all their mitigations are classified as
mitigate-by-context) or the system itself (when all their mitigations are classi-
fied as mitigate-by-system). On the other hand, there are risks for which this
obligation is shared between the system context and the system. Therefore, in
the classification made in this step, we aim to identify to which group of risks
the mitigations are applicable.
4.5. Step 7: Consolidate Mitigations
Only mitigations assigned to the system, i.e., mitigations classified as mitigate-
by-system in Step 6, are considered in this step. Mitigate-by-context mitigations
are not carried forward since context domains are responsible for implementing
them.
The step involves the consolidation of mitigations reoccurring in several risks
(based on the output of the previous step), and consists of (1) numbering miti-
gations, (2) assigning to each of them a list of risks it rebuts, and (3) updating
their description to comply with all these risks, if applicable. Some of these mit-
igations, themselves, could introduce new risks and therefore should be assessed
in a new round of inner argumentation (arrow from Step 7 to Step 5 in Fig. 6).
5The automated search is available in the RISA repository at http://sead1.open.ac.uk/
risa/search.php
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4.6. Step 8: Prioritise Risks
In the last step, risks are prioritised on the basis of their risk level (e.g.,
likelihood × impact) from expert estimation, as indicated by an input arrow
feeding Step 8 in Fig. 6). The catalogues contain, for some entries, predefined
ratings of likelihood and impact but they need to be customized (especially the
impact rating) to the system under analysis. These risk levels affect the priority
of outer arguments, and therefore, of security requirements to be satisfied (arrow
from Step 8 to Steps 1–4, Fig. 6).
When the residual risks from the inner argumentation are deemed to be ac-
ceptable, given limitations found in practice (e.g., limitations of development
resources), the system is considered to have reached a level of satisfactory secu-
rity.
5. The OpenRISA Tool
This section presents a domain-specific modelling language corresponding to
the metamodel of outer arguments, inner arguments and risks assessment shown
in Fig. 3. The language presented here extends the argumentation language
presented by Yu et al. (2011). This section highlights the syntax and semantics
of the integrated argumentation language. It also illustrates the algorithms for
checking rebuttals and mitigations in the inner and outer arguments.
5.1. Novelty of OpenRISA
OpenRISA proposes an integrated modelling language for argumentation and
risk assessment. For the outer arguments expressed in this new language, the
OpenRISA6 tool supports (1) formal checking if the risks found by searching the
catalogues are indeed rebuttals to the satisfaction argument; (2) formal check-
ing if the mitigations to the risks are indeed capable of restoring the rebutted
arguments; and (3) prioritising the risks based on a global threshold for selecting
the relevant arguments.
In terms of the steps in the RISA method, the OpenRISA tool can be used
to (i) check the satisfiability of the outer arguments in Step 4 through formal
reasoning, (ii) describe and visualise the informal inner arguments in Steps 5 to
Steps 7, and (iii) identify prioritised risks in Step 8.
5.2. Syntax of Outer Arguments
Following Haley et al., we use propositional logic to write the outer argu-
ments. In the syntax of OpenRISA, propositional variables are first defined and
described before a formula is written.
6The tool is available to be downloaded as an Eclipse rich client applications from http:
//sead1.open.ac.uk/risa.
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1 argument : prop example
3 boolean S1 , S2 , S3
5 S1 " User enters ID and passcode " with S1
6 S2 " User ID and passcode match a pair
7 of stored ID and passcode " with S2
8 S3 " User is a valid user " with
9 S1 & S2 −> S3
In the above example, three propositional variables S1, S2 and S3 are defined
and described using strings in lines 5–8. The keyword with indicates the formal
assertion: S1 and S2 assert that they are both true, whilst S3 asserts that
S1 ∧ S2 → S3. Logical connectives are written using the standard encoding:
! for negation, & for conjunction, | for disjunction, -> for implication and
<-> for equivalence. The three statements together therefore say that, S1, S2,
S1 ∧ S2 → S3. OpenRISA is integrated with the tool Decreasoner (Mueller,
2011), and can check the correctness of the propositional formula such as this.
5.3. Visual and Textual Syntax of Inner Arguments
Each inner argument has exactly one claim. A claim is a proposition whose
truth value is to be established by the grounds and warrants supporting the
claim. When there is no ground or warrant supporting the claim, we take the
claim to be self-evident, or a ground. In other words, a ground is an argument
with a claim with no supporting ground or warrant. As shown in Fig. 9, visually
an argument is represented by a rectangle with three compartments. In the top
compartment, the single claim of the argument is written in format of ID:
Description round# where ID is the identifier of the claim, Description is a
natural language description of the claim, and round# is a time stamp indicating
the round at which the claim is introduced.
Figure 9: A simple argument
In the middle compartment of the argument with the claim A1 is another
argument F1 with three compartments. Since only the claim of the argument
F1 is given, it is taken as a ground for the argument A1. Similarly, W1 is another
ground that warrants that the claim A1 is true because of the ground F1.
The use of the same notation for an argument, a ground, and a warrant
allows the users to easily turn a ground into a claim. For instance, in Fig. 10,
the ground F1 is no longer treated as a ground, rather a claim that needs to be
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Figure 10: A nested argument
supported further by a ground and a warrant. As a result F1 is now changed into
the claim of a second argument A2 supported by F3 and W2. This nested style
of syntax is appropriate for representing arguments because during the process
of argumentation, grounds are typically challenged, thus leading to additional
knowledge to be incorporated into the arguments.
Since arguments can be nested, it is often useful to know at what stage during
the argumentation process claims, grounds, and warrants are introduced: this
is indicated by round#. In this example, it is clear that F3 and W2 (round 2)
were introduced after A1, A2 and W1 (round 1).
As well as nesting sub-arguments within arguments, arguments may be re-
lated to other arguments through rebuttal and mitigation relationships. Fig. 11
shows how the nested argument (A1 containing the sub-argument A2), is rebut-
ted by another argument A3. The rebuttal relationship is represented by the
dotted red line, indicating that the claim of the argument A2 cannot hold be-
cause some unauthorised people can also obtain valid IDs and passcodes. The
effect of this rebuttal is not only that the argument A2 is false, but the argument
A1 is also false as well: this is indicated by the solid pink arrow pointing at the
boundary of A1. The solid pink link shows the scope of the rebuttal, and is
particularly useful when there are several levels of nesting, and when there are
several rounds of arguments, as it shows clearly the highest level argument that
has been rebutted. Note that the choice of cue for different types of edges is a
combination of dashed/solid arrows and colors as experience showed that color
is not always the best cue for visualisation Ernst et al. (2006).
In the RISA method, a rebuttal to a security argument represents a risk, and
may be addressed by a mitigation. Generally, a mitigation restores the claim
that has been negated by a rebuttal. In the example in Fig. 11, the mitigation
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Figure 11: An argument and its rebuttal
to A3 could be an argument that claims that legitimate users are instructed
not to divulge their IDs and passcodes. Notice that this mitigation argument
does not necessarily say that A3 is false: it simply says that the rebuttal can
be tolerated by giving legitimate users certain responsibility. Since a system
cannot prevent a user from divulging their ID and passcode, the rebuttal A3
remains valid. This is a kind of residual risk to the system. Diagrammatically,
a mitigation relationship is represented by a solid green arrow.
5.4. Integrated Syntax for Arguments and Risks
The graphical syntax of arguments is represented as simple user-editable
textual syntax, and the two syntaxes are supported by bi-directional synchro-
nisation between the editors created using the Eclipse Modelling Framework
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(EMF) and the Graphical Modelling Framework (GMF). Furthermore, the tex-
tual syntax may also contain formal arguments in propositional logic, which are
ignored by the synchronisation. The informal arguments shown in Fig. 11, and
their formalisation are described by the following textual syntax.
1 argument : a r g r e bu t t a l
3 boolean A1 , A2 , A3 , F3 , F4 , W1, W2, W3
5 A1 rebutted by A3 on A2
7 A1 " Unauthorised access is prevented " round 1 {
8 supported by
9 A2 " Each user needs to provide
10 valid ID and passcode " round 1 {
11 supported by
12 F3 " Each legitimate user is given
13 an ID and passcode " round 2
14 warranted by
15 W2 " Users remember their IDs and
16 passcodes " round 2
17 }
18 warranted by
19 W1 " Users without valid IDs and
20 passcodes are denied access " round 1
21 }
23 A3 " Users could divulge their IDs and
24 passcodes " round 3 priority 8 {
25 supported by
26 F4 " Some users might share their IDs and
27 passcodes " round 3
28 warranted by
29 W3 " Shared IDs and passcodes may allow
30 unauthorised access " round 3
31 }
In the RISA method, the outer arguments are elicited through a systematic
procedure from the premises of the causal phenomena in the context diagrams
, whilst the inner arguments, in particular, the identification of rebuttals and
mitigations are based on risk assessment. OpenRISA syntax now allows entries
from catalogues, such as CAPEC and CWE, to be included in the informal
argument.
5.5. Automated Reasoning about Arguments in Integrated Syntax
The OpenRISA tool supports the checking of risks and mitigations from inner
arguments based on propositional logic, and identification of risks. It checks
the overall satisfaction of the claims of security requirements for the validity of a
risk or a mitigation. When it is iteratively applied to all the rounds, it is possible
to identify whether or not the logic rebuttal holds or not. The reification of the
logical literals and the natural language expressions of the facts are, however,
not checked by the logic reasoning. This reasoning is implemented by the two
algorithms discussed below.
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When formalising the argumentation as propositions, the basic structure of
an argument is transformed into the following formula:
PG ∧ PW → PC (3)
where PG is the conjunction of the propositions of the grounds, PW is the
conjunction of the propositions of the warrants, and PC is the conjunction of
propositions of the claim.
Note the difference between → in (3) and ` in (2): the propositional logic is
used here as one of many possible formal logics. For domain experts, proposi-
tional logic is conceptually simpler than higher-order logic and practically sup-
ported by reasoning tools. Instead of higher-order logic rules, we capture risks
and mitigations as the iterative argumentation structure and use the associated
algorithmic process to achieve the non-monotonic reasoning.
The tool automatically extracts the identifiers of the claims as propositional
literals and constructs a propositional formula accordingly in the conjunctive
normal form. Syntactically, every informal claim may be accompanied by a
propositional formula, such as the formula for S3. The tool first parses the
syntax of the propositional formula, and adapting the xtext unparsing API,
it can weave both the implicit logic rule (3) with the user-defined rules into a
syntactically correct propositional statement according to the BNF production
rules of Event Calculus.
Our algorithms traverse the round-based incremental argumentation struc-
ture to check all possible rebuttals and mitigations between adjacent rounds
for effective ones: any rebuttal negates the argued claim, and any mitigation
removes the negation of the previous rebuttals.
When adding further rounds of arguments, the logic knowledge base is non-
monotonic. Therefore, support for the initial claims has to be re-examined after
each round of increment. The output of the algorithms presents the effective ar-
gumentation process as a directed acyclic graph where nodes are the incremental
arguments and edges are the rebuttal or mitigation relationships between these
arguments of adjacent rounds.
Since arguments are typically constructed incrementally, in several rounds,
there are usually many sequences of arguments, rebuttals and mitigations in
an argument graph. Algorithm 1 enumerates all possible sequences in the ar-
gumentation process (Lines 3-15). For each sequence, Algorithm 2 is used to
identify the incremental arguments that rebut and mitigate the previous argu-
ments (Lines 8-11). Note that an incremental argument is checked only if its
priority is between the lower and upper bounds of a user-defined range. In other
words, a rebuttal with the risk below a certain level or a mitigation with the
cost above a certain threshold7 will not be used for reasoning.
On each sequence of incremental arguments s′, rebuttals and mitigations
may only appear alternately. Algorithm 2 takes the input from the sequence
7Although the OpenRISA tool already supports the assignment of cost to mitigations, the
RISA method at its current state does not take advantage of this feature.
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Input: A∗ = {a | a.r ∈ N}: a set of incremental arguments a, annotated by a natural
number a.r ∈ N to indicate the round of a ;
Output: Rebuttals R∗ = {(ai′ , ai−1, ar)} and
Mitigations M∗ = {(ai′ , ai−1, ai)} where 1 ≤ i′ < i ≤ maxa∈A∗ (a.r).
1 begin
2 S := {()} // initially a set of an empty sequence
3 for i = 1,maxa∈A∗ (a.r) do
4 S′ := {}
5 for s ∈ S do
6 // each round of argumentation
7 for each a ∈ A∗ | a.r = i do
8 s′ := concat(s, a)
9 R,M := CheckingArgumentRelationships(s′) // see Algorithm 2
10 R∗,M∗ := R∗ ∪R,M∗ ∪M
11 S′ := S′ ∪ {s′}
12 end
13 end
14 S := S′
15 end
16 end
Algorithm 1: Note that set notations are used extensively, where the round
number of argument structure is element of N which is the set of natural
numbers.
s′ and generates the output as rebuttals R and mitigations M . Specifically,
Line 6 updates the knowledge bases at round r by taking into account the
newly introduced, removed and modified facts; Line 10 invokes an external
reasoning tool (Decreasoner) Mueller (2011) to turn the encoded propositional
logic formula into a satisfiability formula for a solver. Lines 14-29 convert the
satisfiability evaluation results into risks and mitigations.
Let n = maxa∈A∗ a.r be the number of rounds in the argumentation process,
the complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(m) after factoring out all possible arguments
that need checking where the input size
m = |S| = Πi=1..n|{a|a.r = i}| is the total number of possible sequences of ar-
gumentations. For example, if there is one original claim to be argued, suppose
there are 2 incremental arguments at the first round, 3 incremental arguments
at the second round, and 2 incremental arguments at the third round, then the
number of possible argumentation sequences is 1× 2× 3× 2 = 12.
Algorithm 2 has a complexity of O(n2) set operations for incremental up-
dates of the knowledge bases, plus O(n2) inquiries of the knowledge bases to
verify all the claims. According to our implementations using Decreasoner,
the automated reasoning is quick especially when the arguments are introduced
incrementally. Although the SAT solver is called by O(n2) times, for a more
complex argument diagram of 64 nodes and 5 rounds, it produces the reasoning
results in less than 10 seconds. Even though satisfiability problem computation
is NP-complete in terms of computational complexity for the worse cases, with
the practical purposes in our case study it is shown quite effective.
Of course, if one only would check the argument for one particular claim
rather than all possible claims, the complexity can reduce to O(n) by converting
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Input: s = (a1, . . . , an) for n ∈ N is a sequence of incremental arguments in the form
of an.G, an.W ` an.C;
Output: For the argument at the i′-th round with a claim KBi′ ` ai′ .C where
1 ≤ i′ < i ≤ n:
a) rebuttals: R = {(ai′ , ai−1, ai) | ` ai′ .C) ∧ (KBi ` ¬ai′ .C};
b) mitigations: M = {(ai′ , ai−1, ai) | (KBi−1 ` ¬ai′ .C) ∧ (KBi ` ai′ .C)}.
1 begin
2 KB0 := {}
3 for i = 1, n do
4 // update the knowledge base at the i-th round:
5 a = s[i]
6 KBi := KBi−1 ∪ a.Gr ∪ a.Wr \ {A−i′→i}
7 // verify the satisfaction on the original claims
8 for i′ = 1, i,+1 do
9 a’ = s[i’]
10 Vi,i′ := eval (KBi ` a′.C) // decreasoner
11 end
12 end
13 // output the verification results
14 for i′ = 1, n− 1 do
15 if Vi′,i′ then
16 for i = i′ + 1, n do
17 if Vi−1,i′ ∧ ¬Vi,i′ then
18 R := R ∪ {(ai′ , ai−1, ai)}
19 else
20 break
21 end
22 if ¬Vi−1,i′ ∧ Vi,i′ then
23 M := M ∪ {(ai′ , ai−1, ai)}
24 else
25 break
26 end
27 end
28 end
29 end
30 end
Algorithm 3: Note that set notation is used extensively, the grounds (G),
warrants (W) and claim (C) components of the argument structure are ac-
cessed by “.” operator. The symbol KB stands for the knowledge base which
is a collection of propositions in the conjunctive normal form.
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the loop in Lines 8-11 into a single iteration.
6. The PIN Entry Device (PED) example
PIN Entry Device (PED) is a type of device widely-deployed and used by
consumers to pay for goods with debit or credit smartcards at the Points-Of-Sale
(POS).
When using the device, cardholders typically insert their cards, issued by a
financial institution, into a card-reader interface of the PED, enter the PIN using
the PED’s keypad, and confirm the transaction value via a display on the PED
itself. Then smartcard-based systems are expected to authenticate cardholders
via the PIN and verify the card details against a public-key certificate before
transactions can be completed successfully. These certificates are usually stored
on the chip but they can also be stored on the magnetic strip for compatibility
with card-readers that have not adopted this technology.
Most PEDs used in Europe implement the EMV (EuroPay, MasterCard and
Visa) protocol in the process of authentication and authorization of payment
transactions. This protocol drives the communication at the PED-card interface
and the PED-bank interface. The protocol in principle allows only encrypted
transmission of the PIN across these interfaces when the PED, card and bank
support asymmetric cryptography. However, many card issuers in Europe make
the conscious decision to adopt a low-cost EMV option in their smartcards which
researchers (Drimer et al., 2008) have found to the be vulnerable, since it can
be triggered to transmit unencrypted PIN on the interface PED-card.
6.1. The PED example using the OpenRISA tool
We have developed the PED example following the RISA method using the
OpenRISA tool. Note that the example is mainly used for the illustration
purpose of the overall tool-supported approach rather than for the validation of
the approach itself.
6.2. Step 1 to Step 3
The PED documentation (Card Payment Group, 2003; Drimer et al., 2008;
Mastercard, 2004) allowed us to identify the PED overall functional requirement
(FR) – step 1, security goal (SG) – step 2, and two security requirements (SR1)
and (SR2) – step 3:
(FR1) Allow consumers to pay at Points-Of-Sale with PIN
(SG) Protect the PIN
(SR1) PIN entered by consumers shall remain confidential during payment transactions
at Points-Of-Sale
(SR2) PIN entered by consumers shall remain accurate during payment transactions at
Points-Of-Sale (i.e. integrity of the PIN shall be preserved)
Also part of step 3, the system context W in the entailment (1) is elaborated.
The functional requirement of the PED helps us to delimit the context; from
(FR1), we identify five domains: consumer, card, merchant, terminal and bank.
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Figure 12: System context of the PED system and its security requirements
Fig. 12 shows the context of the PED system and its security requirements. The
notation is unusual in two ways: (i) it treats the PED system as a machine with
its own components, and (ii) it represents shared phenomena by directed arrows.
In adopting (ii) we show graphically that a shared phenomenon is controlled by
one domain and observed by another (Jackson, 2001). Therefore, the domain
B with the arrow head observes the phenomenon p controlled by the domain A
without the arrow head. Textually, this is represented by A!p. Notice that the
diagram shows the shared phenomena related not only to PIN, but also to the
card details and the transaction value, which are relevant to the PED payment
transactions.
Note that the assignment of the formal propositional formula to risks and
mitigations still need to be done manually because it is easy for automation
to introduce errors. Therefore, these steps cannot be fully automated. On the
other hand, an explicit documentation of the formula and automated reasoning
tool support make it possible to investigate the intended logic meanings behind
the informal arguments to diagnose unexpected outcomes.
6.3. Step 4: Construct Outer Arguments
According to the entailment (2) and derived from the PED overall behaviour
from the moment the consumer enters a PIN (consumer!PIN) until a payment
transaction is confirmed by the bank (bank!confirmation − transaction), we
have the following outer argument:
(consumer!PIN→ bank!confirmation-transaction) ` (SR1 ∧ SR2) (4)
Premises P1–P6 are warrants that argument consumer!PIN ` bank!confirmation-
transaction is true and therefore that SR1 and SR2 are satisfiable.
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Warrants P1–P6, derived from Fig. 12, are expressed in the OpenRISA tool
notation as follows. Note that for the illustration purposes, we show the premises
by proposition labels with an index starting from 1 instead of 0, while in the
implementation it is easier to start these as an array indexed from 0.
Although there can be more than one sequence of events when explaining
the behaviour of the context diagram, a rebuttal only requires one such instance
of such to demonstrate that the claim does not hold.
1 argument : PED−example
3 boolean A1 , A2 , P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 , P5 , P6
5 A1 " Confidentiality and integrity of PIN are preserved " round 1 {
6 supported by
7 A2 " consumer ! PIN -> bank ! confirmation - transaction " round 1 {
8 warranted by
9 P1 " consumer ! PIN -> keypad ! PIN " round 1
10 P2 " keypad ! PIN -> card - reader ! PIN " round 1
11 P3 " card - reader ! PIN -> card ! confirmation - PIN - ok " round 1
12 P4 " card ! confirmation - PIN - ok -> card - reader ! PIN - confirmed "
13 round 1
14 P5 " card - reader ! PIN - confirmed -> CPU ! authorization - request "
15 round 1
16 P6 " CPU ! authorization - request -> bank ! confirmation - transaction "
17 round 1
18 }
19 }
6.4. Step 5: Identify Risks
Using domains and shared phenomena from the problem diagrams (e.g.,
Fig. 12), we specify a list of keywords which is not exhaustive to demonstrate
the search of catalogues. (Table 1) is an extract of the keywords used to search
the catalogues.
The choice of keywords related to domains and shared phenomena depends
on human judgement. However, the process can be made more systematic if
supported by guide-words inspired by the HAZOP technique. HAZOP (HAZ-
ard and OPerability) has been used for decades for the analysis of hazards
and operational threats on safety (Ericson, 2005). More recently, HAZOP has
been adapted with guide-words when assessing system security (Winther et al.,
2001). Pre-defined guide-words associated with relevant terms (e.g., password,
human subject, payment) could be created based on terms which often appear
in security catalogues.
From the analysis of CWE and CAPEC entries returned by the search func-
tionality of the OpenRISA, a list of 35 risks and 19 mitigations were identified
for the PED example, after eliminating, according to the domain expertise, the
false positives returned by the keywords search . These risks invalidate the sat-
isfaction of this security argument A1 by rebutting its warrants P1–P6 in prac-
tice. For instance, risk R1 rebuts argument A1 (premise P1) and is supported
by CAPEC-455 and CAPEC-89, While risk R8 rebuts argument A1 (premises
P2 and P5) and is supported by CWE-311, CWE-325 and CAPEC-439.
Risks are expressed in the OpenRISA tool notation as show in the listing
below; note that this listing complements the previous one defining A1.
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Table 1: Keywords related to premises P1–P3 used to search both catalogues in the PED
example
Domains/ phenomena Keyword
consumer
social
victim
PIN
PIN
password
encrypt
unencrypt
cryptograph
PED
tamper
physic
log
card card
1 argument : PED−example
3 boolean A1 , R1 , . . . R35
5 A1 rebutted by R1 , . . . , R35
7 R1 " PIN is collected by fake PED set to allow pharming attack " round 2 {
8 supported by
9 CAPEC−455 " CAPEC -455 "
10 CAPEC−89 " CAPEC -89 "
11 }
12 . . .
13 R8 " PIN is revealed if sent unencrypted within the PED and the PED can
14 be tampered " round 2 {
15 supported by
16 CWE−311 " CWE -311 "
17 CWE−325 " CWE -325 "
18 CAPEC−439 " CAPEC -439 "
19 }
20 . . .
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6.5. Steps 6 and 7: Identify, Classify & Consolidate Mitigations
The CAPEC and CWE entries describe possible mitigations. For instance,
from the catalogues we derived the following mitigations to rebut risks R1 and
R8, restoring argument A1, and expressed in the OpenRISA tool notation; note
that this listing complements the one defining risks (round 2).
1 argument : PED−example
3 boolean R1 , . . . , R35 , M1, . . . , R19
5 R1 mit igated by M1, M2, M3
6 R8 mit igated by M5, M6, M7
7 . . .
8 M1 " PED should use secure connection ( encryption ) to handle PIN between
9 the moment it is entered by the consumer until it reaches the PED
10 keypad " round 3 {
11 }
12 M2 " PED should have auditing mechanisms to log device replacements ,
13 keypad input and any event affecting its integrity " round 3 {
14 }
15 M3 " PED should have authentication mechanisms to restrict replacement &
16 deployment procedures to be performed only by authorized technicians "
17 round 3 {
18 }
19 M5 " Transmission of PIN within PED , between PED & bank and PED & card
20 should use well - vetted encryption algorithms , and well - tested
21 implementations of these algorithms " round 3 {
22 }
23 M6 " PED design should allow upgrade of cryptographic algorithm for
24 communication of PIN within PED , between PED & bank and PED & card "
25 round 3 {
26 }
27 M7 " Requirements for the selection of an encryption algorithm and its
28 implementation should be clearly stated for the PED " round 3 {
29 }
30 . . .
6.6. Step 8: Prioritise Risks
The catalogues provide off-the-shelf support for the estimation of risk level
based on expert ratings for likelihood and impact in terms of confidentiality,
integrity and availability. However, these ratings depend on expert judgement.
The RISA method can be used in conjunction with any technique that estimates
risk level – quantitative, semi-quantitative or even qualitative (where risk level
is assigned to high, medium, or low).
7. Discussions
We organise our discussions around two areas: the catalogues search from
experience gained with the PED example and short-term future work.
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7.1. Systematic Search of Catalogues
The RISA method takes advantage of an automated keyword-based search
for the CAPEC and CWE security catalogues, using pre-defined fields converted
from XML to text. The systematic and repeatable search process incorporated
to the RISA method allowed us to identify 35 risks from the analysis of 207
attack patterns and weaknesses. While the ad hoc search applied to the same
example, as reported in (Franqueira et al., 2011), allowed us to identify only
9 risks, based on the analysis of a small number of catalogue entries. Despite
this significant improvement in catalogues coverage provided by the new search
functionality, several challenges remain.
There are infinite possibilities of keywords which can be used to search the
catalogues related to a same premise. We partially addressed this issue by
applying the Porter Stemming algorithm (Porter, 1980) to remove common En-
glish suffixes. Therefore, keywords provided are automatically reduced to stems
(when applicable), increasing the coverage of the catalogues while decreasing
the number of keywords. Nevertheless, translating an information need into a
searchable query is not necessarily straight forward (Borgman, 1996). We re-
flect on our experiences using RISA’s catalogue search in terms of precision and
recall illustrated by examples.
Keyword encrypt uncovers weakness CWE-807 (Reliance on Untrusted In-
puts in a Security Decision) used as reference for risk R1.18. However, weakness
CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation) would be even more appropriate as a ref-
erence for this risk. CWE-20 was not found because its description summary
and extended description contained none of the keywords searched. This issue
may affect the identification of mitigations and the prioritisation of risks.
RISA’s search using keyword log returns catalogue entries related to log
file(s), audit log(s) and logging, which represent true-positives and should be
analysed. Yet, it also returns false-positives related to, e.g., log in or logged.
This raises a question about whether to increase the precision of keywords (e.g.,
using compound keywords), or coping with an increased number of search re-
sults. We used the off-the-shelf Lucene search engine to compute the relevance
of queries (keywords selected from outer argument) and documents (public cat-
alogues), therefore it has room for missing matches, in addition to the risk of
generalisation/specialisation mismatches.
There are other factors which influence the choice of keywords, such as
awareness of security jargon, familiarity with the catalogues themselves, and
grasp of terms related to the system domain, and technologies involved. Apart
from Porter’s stems, we proposed the use of guided-words, inspired by HA-
ZOP (Winther et al., 2001; Ericson, 2005), as another way to make the choice
of keywords more systematic. However, all in all, the choice of keywords af-
fecting search results is an intrinsic problem in several other domains as well,
such as in Web search. But, since end-users practice and training may minimise
this issue in online search (Kim, 2001), we expect the same to happen with
requirements engineers.
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7.2. Future Work
In the following, we identify two areas of further research as well as a list of
short-term improvements to RISA.
7.2.1. Feedback from the Risk Assessment Steps to the Requirements Satisfac-
tion Steps
Although OpenRISA provides mechanisms for maintaining traceability be-
tween arguments and requirement models, they can be enhanced in a number of
ways. First, risks assessment can identify new problem world domains, changes
in behaviour and properties of the problem world domains, and even new secu-
rity requirements. Such new knowledge is to be integrated with the requirements
models. This is currently done manually, but tool support for this task will be
helpful.
Second, since there can be a number of rebuttals and mitigations to an argu-
ment, the size of argument models often increase quickly after a few rounds of
argumentation. It is difficult to visualise large argument models, and heuristics
for partitioning arguments are necessary in OpenRISA.
Third, the keywords general or specific to security domain need to be col-
lected to guide the search of the risk for the argumentation-based elicitation.
We hope to extend the current ad hoc approach with HAZOP-like guided-words
(as mentioned in Section 6.4) based on domain ontology that has been intro-
duced by the effort of the entire research community, and based on terms that
often appear in the security catalogues.
Finally, we aim to integrate other requirements languages in order to sup-
port their integration with risk assessment frameworks. For instance, we have
developed a tool supporting the Problem Frames approach, called OpenPF (Tun
et al., 2009). One way to integrate the two tools will be by means of graphi-
cal traceability. The integrated tool can allow each risk and mitigation to be
explicitly linked with a problem world domain of a problem diagram drawn in
OpenPF. Similarly, each problem world domain in the problem diagram can link
to an argument or any part of it, maintaining the traceability between problem
diagrams and argument diagrams.
7.2.2. Risk-based Prioritisation of Arguments
Currently, RISA prioritizes arguments based on risk level depending on ex-
perts’ estimation of risks. Security catalogues supporting RISA provide some
pre-defined, generic, ratings of likelihood and impact on confidentiality, integrity
and availability but they still need customisation. Prioritization via risk level
fits into a risk-averse perspective which favours risk over, for instance, the cost
of implementing mitigations. However, prioritisation could follow a risk-taking
perspective where the cost of mitigations is more important than risks, or a
perspective in-between which gives importance to both risks and mitigations
taking cost/benefit into consideration (Franqueira et al., 2010, e.g.,). Although
the current version of the OpenRISA tool already supports priority value for
mitigations, more development is necessary to fully operationalise these priori-
tisation possibilities.
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Another approach to overcome this risk-only prioritisation would be to adopt
a value-based argumentation approach, where a value is associated with an ar-
gument and affects the conclusion about a claim. This accounts for the fact that
stakeholders have different priorities, which might conflict. Adding value to ar-
guments is a way to make these priorities explicit and, therefore, expose them
to scrutiny and criticism (Graydon and Knight, 2008). For instance, Burge-
meestre et al. (2010) consider, in their example, arguments flagged with the
values safety and auditability, Baroni et al. (2009) consider safety and cost,
while Bench-Capon (2003) discusses a moral debate where an ordering on val-
ues allows distinct audiences to set different preferences, e.g., life has priority
over property or the other way round.
Value-based argumentation applied to RISA would be helpful, for example,
to allow different prioritisations of arguments based on preferences among dif-
ferent values associated with mitigations, such as cost of implementing them
and their operational cost, or even different values associated with risks, such as
likelihood, and impact. Such direction requires changes in the OpenRISA tool
to support more than one priority value for arguments.
7.2.3. Further Enhancement for Adoption
Presenting all increments of argumentations in one diagram may not be the
most scalable solution when the diagram is large, even though the textual input
can support very large structures. The diagram part of the OpenRISA tool may
improve with learning special-purpose visualisations such as tree-based view of
arguments in (Cyra and Go´rski, 2011).
Apart from visualisations, there are other ways to represent arguments
graphically. For example, Prakken et al. (2013) has proposed to represent AS-
PIC+ arguments as a participatory game.
Ionita et al. (2014) have proposed a stripped down version of ASPIC+, which
has been received positively by practitioners. The OpenRISA representation
may have a similar impact by presenting a simplified view to the practitioners.
Furthermore, the reasoning behind the formal argumentation needs to be
understandable for the users. In (Yu et al., 2014), we have shown that a de-
ductive theorem proof can provide provenance on how to deduce the conclusion
of risks and mitigations from the grounds and warrants. A future work is to
provide more traceability in the tool for such explanations on the fly.
Although the argumentation side of OpenRISA has been evaluated with an
industry evaluator at DeepBlue (Yu et al., 2011), the overall approach has not
yet been applied fully to the wider industry.
8. Conclusion
Argumentation approaches organise the evidence for or against the claims
of software security. They aim to strike a balance between perfect security
and practical limitations. This paper has proposed a tool, OpenRISA, which
supports the use of argumentation and risk assessment together to reason about
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the satisfaction of security requirements. OpenRISA has three main features.
First, it supports representing both argumentation and security risk assessment
in an integrated modelling language. Second, it provides an automated search
for publicly available catalogues of common attacks and weaknesses, namely
CWE and CAPEC, as evolving sources for security risk assessment. Third, it
checks the soundness of the formalised arguments challenged by the security
risk assessment. The tool has been demonstrated through an example of PIN
Entry Device system, part of which has been discussed in the paper.
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